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PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. ROUNDS 
& INFORMED CONSENT 
By: Kate Aizpuru' 
I. Introduction 
In 2005, South Dakota enacted some of 
the most stringent anti-abortion legislation in the 
country.2 Among other restrictions, the regulations 
included an informed consent provision that requires 
the abortion provider to give the pregnant person, 
"[a] description of all known medical risks of the 
procedure and statistically significant risk factors 
to which the pregnant woman would be subjected, 
including ... [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and 
suicide" (the "suicide advisory"). 3 In July 2012, in the 
matter of Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, the Eighth 
Circuit held that the suicide advisory was, ''truthful, 
non-misleading information relevant to a patient's 
decision to have an abortion," and therefore was 
constitutional under the "undue burden" standard 
put forward in Casey. 4 
This paper will argue that the Eighth Circuit's 
decision subverts commonly accepted informed 
consent standards by endangering a patient's ability to 
make intelligent and autonomous decisions regarding 
their treatment options. The paper will further explain 
how the misleading information that South Dakota 
physicians are now required to give will damage 
the concept of informed consent at the expense of 
accurate advice, specifically tailored medical advice. 
This paper will also explain how the Eighth Circuit 
arrived at the opposite conclusion by exploring 
how the Eighth Circuit's decision endorses the 
promulgation of highly ideological laws that promote 
the state's preference for childbirth at the expense of 
actual informed consent. The paper will further argue 
that the decision creates a problematic precedent for 
doctors and patients - in both the context of abortion 
and the doctor-patient relationship generally. 
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First, the suicide advisory damages informed 
consent in South Dakota by requiring the physician 
to give the patient information that is misleading. 
Second, the Eighth Circuit's decision endorses the 
promulgation of highly ideological laws that promote 
the state's preference for childbirth at the expense of 
actual informed consent. Informed consent standards 
are intended to allow a patient, in evaluating her 
medical choices, to make an intelligent, autonomous 
decision. Thus, informed consent becomes 
illusory, because the consent given is predicated on 
information that may be misleading, confusing or 
otherwise irrelevant to the specific patient. 
II. The Suicide Advisory is Damaging to 
Informed Consent in South Dakota 
The suicide advisory hinders informed 
consent because it is misleading, and is likely 
irrelevant in most cases. The purpose of informed 
consent rules is to ensure that patients are aware of 
all information material to their healthcare, are fully 
able to evaluate their medical choices, and allow 
them to make intelligent choices while protecting 
their individual interests. 5 Salgo v. Leland Stanford 
Jr. University, the first American case to employ 
the term, concluded that physicians must provide 
the information necessary for a patient to make 
an "intelligent decision" about treatment. 6 The 
information required by informed consent standards 
is typically factual in nature and directly relevant to 
the patient's medical circumstances.7 A provision of 
such information gives the patient the ability to weigh 
her own interests, values and preferences against the 
risks and benefits she would likely face via different 
treatment options.8 In doing so, the informed consent 
standard promotes a patient's autonomy and right to 
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self-determination.'J The Eighth Circuit's decision, 
requiring physicians to provide the suicide advisory, 
is damaging to the standard of informed consent 
because it unreasonably violates a patient's ability to 
make well-informed, intelligent choices about their 
treatment and compromises the decision-making 
autonomy of patients. 
First, the informed consent statute is 
misleading. In contrast to the information provided 
in informed consent statements, the suicide advisory 
is misleading because it implies causation between 
abortion and suicide despite the fact that proof of 
such a relationship does not exist. 10 The advisory and 
the opinion are premised on research demonstrating 
a correlation between abortion and relative risk of 
suicide. A correlation is different from causation. 
Correlation describes a relationship where two variables 
are related such that if the value of one changes, the 
other changes at the same rate. 11 Causation, on the 
other hand, indicates that one event is the result of 
the occurrence of the other event. 12 A correlation can 
be created by causation, but the two variables are not 
necessarily related in that way. 13 For example, smoking 
is correlated with alcoholism: people who smoke are 
also likely to be alcoholics. 14 However, smoking does 
not cause alcoholism. 15 The term "relative risk" is 
another way to describe a correlation. Thus, while 
some research (which is heavily disputed, as I will 
discuss below) shows a correlation between abortion 
and relative risk of suicide (i.e. that women who 
obtain abortion care are more likely to commit suicide 
than other women), or a relative risk of suicide among 
women who obtained an abortion, the presence of 
that correlation does not necessarily mean that the two 
variables-abortion and suicide-are causally related. 
Moreover, in addition to obfuscating the difference 
between correlation and causation, the advisory is 
further misleading because physicians are required to 
provide it even in cases where it may be inapplicable. 16 
In order to argue that the suicide advisory 
disclosure is not misleading, South Dakota submitted 
various studies that demonstrated a correlation 
between abortion and suicide.17 Although experts 
have criticized the results of most of the studies for 
flaws in methodology, 18 according to the Eighth 
Circuit, the presence of a correlation is sufficient to 
conclude that the suicide advisory is truthful. 19 Judge 
Gruender, writing for the majority, concluded that 
when the statute requires physicians to discuss an 
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"increased risk," that term refers only to "a relatively 
higher probability of an adverse outcome in one 
group compared to other groups-that is, to 'relative 
risk.'"20 His interpretation of the term "increased risk" 
relied on the use of the term in the technical, scientific 
literature submitted into evidence by proponents 
of the law. 21 He then concluded that the contextual 
definition of "relative risk" does not require proof 
of causation, at least as it pertained to the materials 
provided by supporters of the suicide advisory. 22 
Judge Gruender's analysis of relative risk is 
problematic for several reasons. First, by imputing 
into the suicide advisory a technical definition of 
"increased risk" which does not imply causation, the 
Eighth Circuit disregarded the importance of lay 
understanding in evaluating whether the advisory 
is misleading. The majority opinion read "increased 
risk" to mean "risk in a medical context. "23 The 
medical definition the majority decided upon was 
relative risk, which, as noted above, merely implies 
correlation, not causation. 24 However, the language 
of the statute does not require the physician to refer 
to "relative risk" or "risk in the medical context;" 
to inform the patient that "risk" refers only to a 
correlation or association, or to otherwise advise 
patients on the meaning of "increased risk." The 
suicide advisory simply requires that physicians 
specifically inform all women seeking abortion that 
the procedure carries with it an "increased risk of 
suicide and suicide ideation. "25 
The precise meaning of "risk" is left up 
to the individual physician to clarify (or not) and 
thus leaves wide open the possibility that a patient 
will misinterpret the suicide advisory to imply 
causation between abortion and suicide. 26 The Eighth 
Circuit's decision assumes that, either the patient 
will understand "increased risk" to indicate the mere 
presence of a correlation or the physician will explain 
the difference between correlation and causation. It 
also assumes that, if presented with the distinction 
between correlation and causation, the patient will 
understand the distinction and make her decision 
accordingly. It is common, however, to confuse 
correlation/relative risk and causation, as evidenced 
by the American Psychological Association (AP A) 
report cited by the majority,27 which suggested that 
research on the connection between abortion and 
mental health problems demonstrated a negative 
"tendency to confuse a risk and a cause. "28 If such 
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misunderstanding is common among professionals, 
it stands to reason that the confusion is even more 
common among average people. For a patient who 
is unaware of or does not understand that important 
distinction between risk-as-causation and risk-as-
correlation, the advisory is misleading. Yet neither 
the legislature nor the majority in Rounds appeared 
concerned with the possibility that a woman might 
infer an erroneous causal connection after being 
told that a "risk factor" of abortion is "increased 
risk'' of suicide. If actual informed consent were 
truly the objective of the legislature, it should have 
safeguarded against such a potentially important 
misunderstanding. Because the legislature failed to 
do so, however, the Eighth Circuit should not have 
upheld the statute because of its misleading effect. 
Judge Gruender's next step in evaluating 
whether the suicide advisory was misleading was to 
characterize the evidence presented by both parties as 
to whether abortion lead to an increased relative risk 
of suicide. He characterized the available evidence 
as showing "some degree of medical and scientific 
uncertainty ... as to whether abortion places a causal 
role in the observed correlation between abortion 
and suicide."29 However, there is "no proof in the 
medical literature that abortion causes suicide," and 
unfortunately for the women of South Dakota, the 
Judge failed to consider the significant problems 
with much of the research that indicated existence 
of a correlation.30 Researchers at the University of 
California found that the study upon which Judge 
Gruender relied "ha[d] fundamental analytical errors 
that render its conclusions invalid."31 One researcher 
even characterized the study as "an abuse of the 
scientific process to reach conclusions that are not 
supported by the data. "32 
In fact, the APA has found that "the best 
scientific evidence published indicates that among 
adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy the 
relative risk of mental health problems is no greater" 
if they have an elective first-trimester abortion than 
if they give birth.33 Other research supports that 
finding. 34 The vast majority of abortions in the 
United States occur during the first trimester35 and 
are a response to an unplanned pregnancy36-so 
for most women, there is no such increased relative 
risk. For other women, it is true that the some 
women experience sadness, grief, and other feelings 
of loss following an abortion. In an extensive review, 
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however, of all the literature on the relationship 
between mental health and abortion, the APA found 
"no evidence sufficient to support the claim" that 
where a person has both a history of abortion and 
a history of mental health issues, the mental health 
issues resulted from the abortion. 37 
Judge Gruender's analysis suggests that 
where some correlation exists, it is therefore ''non-
misleading" for a physician to imply to a patient 
that causation exists, simply because a conclusive 
determination on causation has not been made. 
Indeed, the opinion stated that Planned Parenthood 
would have to "show that any 'medical and scientific 
uncertainty' has been resolved into a certainty against 
a causal role for abortion" in order for the suicide 
advisory to be held unconstitutionally misleading. 38 
This position is outrageous for two reasons. First, it 
would be impossible to prove or disprove causation in 
the abortion context, because it would be unethical 
to assign women with unwanted pregnancies to 
abortion versus delivery or adoption groups and 
perform a clinical trial. 39 Second, any number of 
negative factors could create a correlation like the 
one the court relied on. For example, the APA found 
that "prior mental health emerged as the strongest 
predictor of postabortion mental health",40 meaning 
that the Eighth Circuit's decision allows the state 
to lend its weight to one side of a medical debate 
- despite the fact that the chosen claims are based 
on methodologically suspect data.41 The decision, 
therefore, is manifestly unfair to patients. 
The majority went on to argue that the 
statute is permissible under both Casey and Carhart, 
and Judge Loken, in his concurrence, stated that 
precedent required the statute to be upheld.42 Under 
Casey, states have wide latitude to require "the giving 
of truthful, non-misleading information about the 
nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks 
and those of childbirth"43 even if the disclosure 
might "cause the woman to choose childbirth over 
abortion."44 However, the standard articulated in 
Casey does not require that courts uphold ambiguous 
statutes that confuse, rather than inform, decision-
making. Moreover, it is true that in the wake of 
Carhart, state and federal legislatures enjoy "wide 
discretion to pass legislation in areas where there 
is medical and scientific uncertainty. "45 However, 
Carhart does not say that the legislature has the 
power to compel physicians to warn every patient of 
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a "known" risk, which may be understood to imply 
causation where only a correlation has been shown. 
Thus, the Eighth Circuit could have held the suicide 
disclosure unconstitutional while remaining within 
the boundaries of precedent. 
"" As Judge Murphy's dissent recognized, 
mformed choice is hindered" when a woman is 
simply informed that suicide is a "known medical 
risk" of having an abortion, "when the weight of 
the medical research indicates the opposite and she 
is not informed of the debate."46 The statute forces 
disclosure of a "risk which the medical record refutes"47 
and obfuscates correlation and causation without 
r~quiring clarification of the nature of the "risk" being 
disclosed. If Planned Parenthood is correct that "it is 
more plausible that certain underlying factors, such 
as pre-existing mental health problems, predispose 
some women both to have unwanted pregnancies and 
to have suicidal tendencies, resulting in a misleading 
correlation between abortion and suicide,"48 the 
disclosure would be irrelevant in those cases where 
the underlying factors are not present. 
A further problem with mandated provision 
of the suicide advisory is that physicians are no 
longer able to provide their patients with information 
specifically tailored to the patient's individual needs, 
which could distort the decision-making process.49 
~er Rounds, South Dakota physicians can no longer 
tailor their discussion of the risks and harms of 
abortion (and childbirth) to the unique situation of 
each patient; instead, they must convey standardized 
information that is likely to alter the patient's 
understanding of her choices in favor of the state-
sponsored pro-childbirth position.so By mandating 
use of the suicide advisory, the Court allowed the 
state to inject its interpretation of the relevant medical 
literature into the doctor-patient relationship and the 
patient's decision-making process.s 1 Unfortunately, 
misleading information of the sort provided by the 
suicide advisory does not assist in intelligent decision-
making; rather, it results in a violation of patient 
autonomy known as "informational manipulation."S2 
Informational manipulation occurs when an agent 
manages information in order to alter a person's 
understanding of a situation and induce them to 
do what the agent wants. Thus, it does not facilitate 
autonomous decision-making on the part of women 
seeking abortion in South Dakota, but rather hinders 
the decision-making process. In this manner, the 
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decision subverts the ability of women m South 
Dakota to provide truly informed consent. 
Ill. Rounds Creates Worrisome Precedent for 
Informed Consent Laws Everywhere 
Second, in upholding the suicide advisory, 
the Eighth Circuit gave legitimacy and support 
to a specific class of anti-abortion laws that are 
designed to "unduly influence a woman's choice, 
in violation of the ethical boundaries of medical 
informed consent."s3 These laws, known as "woman-
protective" anti-abortion laws, are designed to outlaw 
abortion on the premise that abortion presents 
various harms to women. Woman-protective anti-
abortion laws are frequently justified using suspect 
social science claims, religious mores, and anecdote 
rather than empirical studies of abortion's effects on 
public health.s4 The suicide advisory is no exception; 
in enacting the 2005 anti-abortion law, the South 
Dakota legislature relied heavily on a Report prepared 
by the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion.ss 
Significantly, that report was later renounced by the 
Task Force's chair, an obstetrician and anti-abortion 
activist, for being "biased and opinionated" and "less 
than completely objective and factual."S6 
The precise type of woman-protective law 
that Rounds upholds is the abortion-specific informed 
consent law. All states already require informed 
consent before a medical procedure (including before 
an abortion), it is a process that has traditionally been 
self-regulated by the medical profession.s7 However, 
many states have enacted additional informed consent 
laws specific to abortion, mandating disclosures that, 
like South Dakota's suicide advisory, "not only go 
beyond what is required for other medical procedures, 
but also include information that is inaccurate, 
incomplete, or irrelevant to the particular abortion 
procedure to be performed."SS As discussed above, 
informed consent standards are intended to facilitate 
autonomous decision-making in the medical context, 
on the basis of relevant, factual information.59 Yet, 
woman-protective anti-abortion laws, and anti-
abortion informed consent requirements specifically, 
are not always designed to provide patients with factual 
information.60 Rather, the laws create "informational 
manipulation," which, in this context, means that the 
state manages the information provided to patients 
5 
regarding abortions in a manner that may alter the 
patient's understanding of their medical situation. 
Furthermore, the information provided could affect 
the patient's course of medical care in a manner 
that may actually be inconsistent with the patient's 
self-interest. 61 
The functioning of the suicide advisory 
provides an example. Without the suicide advisory, a 
South Dakota physician is still required, under normal 
informed consent standards, to provide the patient 
with the information necessary to make an informed 
decision about whether to procure an abortion. 62 If the 
physician, in his or her medical judgment, finds that 
the patient will be at risk for suicide or suicide ideation 
following the procedure, she has a duty to inform the 
patient of that risk.63 On the other hand, if the patient 
is not deemed to be at risk, the doctor has no duty to 
inform the patient of the correlation between suicide 
and abortion. 64 Under the suicide advisory, however, 
the doctor must inform the patient of the risk factor 
regardless of whether the patient is actually at risk. 
When the information is no longer tailored to the 
patient's needs, but instead reflects the state's interests, 
the result is informational manipulation. The 
information may lead the patient to conclude that 
she will necessarily be at increased risk of suicide if 
she chooses abortion (even if this is not the case), and 
instead choose to move forward with the unwanted 
pregnancy.65 The state, of course, hopes to encourage 
the pregnant woman to choose childbirth. 66 But her 
choice to do so is not truly autonomous if made in the 
face of misleading information deliberately intended 
to influence her choice. 
Abortion-specific informed consent laws have 
sprung up all over the United States.67 By upholding 
the suicide advisory, the Eighth Circuit gave cover 
to other required disclosures that might actually be 
harmful to informed consent. When presented with 
the opportunity to preserve the integrity of informed 
consent and the doctor-patient relationship, the 
Eighth Circuit took the side of state legislatures 
across the country who wish to decide for doctors 
and patients what medical information is material to 
every decision related to abortion. 
Of particular concern is the "no causal 
relationship" standard articulated by Judge Gruender. 68 
This new evidentiary requirement suggests that any 
informed consent legislation could be constitutional 
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as long as there is some demonstrated correlation 
between the disfavored procedure and a risk factor. 
Since the Eighth Circuit gave credence to the notion 
that correlation necessarily shows the possibility of 
causation, 69 it may actually be impossible for a plaintiff 
to claim that such a statute is unconstitutional. In 
the context of abortion-specific informed consent 
laws, this could mean that states can now require 
disclosures of other alleged "risks," including fear of 
vacuums and other pseudo-scientific risk factors that 
some studies purport to correlate with abortion.70 
As long as proponents of the law could demonstrate 
some "medical uncertainty,'' defined in Rounds as the 
possibility of causation shown by the presence of a 
correlation, the required disclosure would not be 
unconstitutional. 
Yet, the holding of Rounds need not be 
restricted to abortion. Indeed, the majority stated that 
informed consent standards should not be different 
just because abortion is concerned.71 Thus, Rounds 
may also hold serious implications for informed 
consent and the practice of medicine more generally. 
When the state decides that it can arbitrarily choose 
which risk factors are important and which are not, 
it violates the physician's autonomy as an expert and 
provider of healthcare.72 When the burden is on the 
plaintiff to completely disprove causation between the 
disfavored procedure and the chosen risk factor, the 
task of removing politics from the examining room 
becomes nearly insurmountable. This decision leaves 
open the opportunity for any state-based information 
manipulation in an informed consent setting. For 
many, abortion may seem a unique enough procedure 
to justify the state's influence on patient choices, but 
the standard articulated by the Eighth Circuit could 
easily extend to other more "mainstream" procedures. 
This possibility should be of concern to doctors 
and patients throughout the country who seek to 
evaluate the risks and benefits of medical procedures, 
including abortion, free from the interference of 
politicians. It suggests that a state can inject itself into 
the fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient 
with the blessing of the federal judiciary.75 It gives 
state legislatures permission to use any correlative 
risk factor to influence medical choices, thereby 
undermining the autonomous decision-making of 
patients. 
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IY. Conclusion 
The Eighth Circuit had the opportunity to 
protect informed consent while remaining within the 
bounds of Casey and Carhart. Instead, the majority 
opinion subordinated informed consent in favor of 
an ideological law based on questionable science. 
The decision is problematic for the women of South 
Dakota, who will now be confronted with politicians' 
determination that all women are at an increased risk 
of suicide following abortion. It is also problematic as 
a matter of precedent, because it gave federal appellate 
approval to a type of informed consent law that has 
very little to do with informed consent. Perhaps most 
dangerous is Judge Gruender's requirement that a 
plaintiff would have to prove no causation whatsoever 
in order to make an informed consent statute 
unconstitutionally misleading. This requirement 
could potentially extend beyond abortion such 
that any required disclosure could be permissible, 
as long as there is some correlation between a risk 
factor and a disfavored procedure. Rounds is a very 
problematic decision for the women of the Eighth 
Circuit, but also for any person who values a doctor-
patient relationship free from the interference and 
manipulation of government preferences. 
(Endnotes) 
Harvard Law School, J.D. Class of2014. Many thanks to 
the staff of The Modern American for their thoughtful edits and 
helpful feedback. 
2 See 2005 S.D. Sess. Laws 356. See also Evelyn Nieves, S.D. 
Makes Abortion Rare Through Laws and Stigma, WASH. POST 
(December 27, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/l 2/26/AR20051226007 47.html. 
3 S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.l(l)(e) (2012). In 
addition to the "suicide advisory," the physician must also list 
"depression and related psychological distress" and the rate of 
deaths due to abortion as risk factors to which the woman would 
be subjected, as well as all other known risks to her physical health 
and the probable gestational age of the fetus. Id. The physician 
is also required to inform the woman that the "abortion will 
terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human 
being," S.D. Codified Laws§ 34-23A-10.l(l)(b), that she "has 
an existing relationship with that unborn human being" which 
enjoys protection under Federal and State law, S.D. Codified 
Laws § 34-23A-10.l(l)(c), and that obtaining the abortion 
will terminate that relationship. S.D. Codified Laws§ 34-23A-
10.l (l)(d). 
SPRIXG2014 
4 See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 
892-893 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Planned Parenthood Minn. v. 
Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 201 I)). Following the enactment 
of the 2005 legislation, Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North 
Dakota, South Dakota filed suit seeking an injunction against 
enforcement of the law. See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. 
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008). The District Court had 
held the suicide advisory to be unconstitutionally vague and an 
undue burden, and a divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed. 
See Rounds, 686 F.3d at 892-93. However, the Eighth Circuit 
granted a rehearing en bane solely on that issue, and reversed the 
panel's decision. See Rounds, 686 F.3d at 892. 
5 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782-783 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972) ("It is well established that the physician must seek 
and secure his patient's consent before commencing an operation 
or other course of treatment ... [l]t is evident that it is normally 
impossible to obtain a consent worthy of the name unless the 
physician first elucidates the options and the perils for the patient's 
edification."). See also RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, 
A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 121, 121 
(Oxford University Press 1986); Janet L. Dolgin, The Legal 
Development of the Informed Consent Doctrine: Past and Present, 
19 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 97 100, 102, 104 
(2010). For an illuminating discussion on the similarities of 
informed consent in medical examination and its similarities to 
abortion law, see Jennifer Yeo, Raising the Standard of Abortion 
Informed Consent: Lessons to be Learned from the Ethical and Legal 
Requirements for Consent to Medical Experimentation, 21 Col um. 
J. Gender & L. 357, 359, 380 (2011). 
6 See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Tr., 317 P.2d 
170, 181 (Cal. Ct.App. 1957). 
7 See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781 ("The cases demonstrate 
that the physician is under an obligation to communicate specific 
information to the patient when the exigencies of reasonable care 
call for it."); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 686 (R.I. 1972) 
("[A] physician has an obligation to make a reasonable explanation 
and disclosure to his patient of the risks and hazards involved 
in a proposed course of treatment to the end that whatever 
consent given by the patient to the prescribed treatment may be 
an informed and intelligent consent."); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 
A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) ("[1lhe primary interest of 
Pennsylvania jurisprudence in regard to informed consent is that 
of having the patient informed of all the material facts from which 
he can make an intelligent choice as to his course of treatment 
... "); Sa!go, 317 P.2d at 181 ("(E]ach patient presents a separate 
problem ... [I] n discussing the element of a risk a certain amount 
of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure 
of facts necessary to an informed consent."). 
8 See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783 ("The context in which the 
duty of risk-disclosure arises is invariably the occasion for decision 
as to whether a particular treatment procedure is to be undertaken 
... (I]t is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to 
determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to 
lie."); Wilkinson, 295 A.2d at 689 ("It is not necessary to tell the 
patient any and all of the possible risks and dangers of a proposed 
procedure . . [M]ateriality is to be the guide."); Cooper, 286 
A.2d at 650 (noting that while the patient must be the "arbiter of 
7 
the medical treatment he will undergo," the physician need not 
"disclose Every [sic] risk"); Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181. 
9 See FADEN, supra note 5; Dolgin, supra note 5. 
IO See Rounds, 686 F.3d at 907 (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
("The most reliable evidence in the record shows that abortion 
does not have a causal relationship to the risk of suicide and that 
South Dakota's mandated advisory is not truthful, but actually 
misleading."). 
11 See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 
Correlation and Causation, Quly 3, 2013), http://www.abs. 
gov.au/websi tedbs/ a3 l 2 l l 20 .nsf/home/ statistical+ language+-
+correlation+and+causation. 
12 
13 
Id. 
Id. 
14 See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 
Correlation and Causation, Quly 3, 2013), http://www.abs. 
gov. au/websi tedbs/a3 l 2 l l 20 .nsf/home/ statistical+ language+-
+correlation+and+causation. 
15 Id. 
16 See Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion 
Counseling Policies and the Fundamental Principles of Informed 
Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL. REv. 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/ pubs/ gpr/ 10/ 4/ gpr 100406 (stating 
that the written materials that several states require doctors to 
provide to women are nong'ermane to the women receiving 
them). 
17 See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 
898 (8th Cir. 2012) (majority opinion). 
18 Id. at 908-10 (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also APA 
Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, REPORT OF THE 
APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION 3 
(2008) (stating that a majority of studies on the relationship 
between abortion and mental health problems "suffered from 
methodological problems, often severe in nature") [hereinafter 
"APA REPORT"]; Vignetta E. Charles et. al., Abortion and long-
term mental health outcomes: a systematic review of the evidence, 
78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 448-49 (2008) (finding that the 
"highest quality studies" showed "few, if any" differences between 
women who obtained abortions and their respective comparison 
groups, while ·'studies with the most flawed methodology 
consistently found negative mental health" outcomes). 
19 See Rounds, 686 F.3d at 898 (majority opinion). 
20 Id. at 894. 
21 Id. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Id. at 900. 
Id. at 894. 
Id. at 894-95. 
S.D. Codified Laws§ 34-23A-10.l(l)(e) (2012). 
26 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Can the Government Require 
Doctors to Provide Misleading Information to Patients Seeking 
Abortions?, VERDICT (Aug. 20, 2012), http://verdict.justia. 
com/2012/08/20/ can-the-government-require-doctors-to-
provide-misleading-information-to-patients-seeking-abortions 
("[M]ost women seeking abortions are not scientists and they 
will therefore assume-incorrectly-that the are hearing about 
a link between abortion and suicide because abortion causes 
suicide. Otherwise, the warning will make no sense."). Cf Peter 
8 
H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L. J. 899, 
945 (1994) (discussing the failure of most physicians to convey 
medical risk to patients in a comprehensible way). 
27 See Rounds, 686 F.3d at 895. 
28 Id. (citing BRENDA MAJOR ET. AL, AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AssocIATION, REPORT OF THE APA TASK 
FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION 20 (2008)). 
29 Id. at 900 (citations omitted). 
30 Id. at 908-911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
31 Joerg Dreweke, Study Purporting to Show Link Between 
Abortion and Mental Health Outcomes Decisively Debunked, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (March 5, 2012), http://www.guttmacher. 
org/ media/ nr/2012/03/05/index.html. 
32 Id. 
33 See APA REPORT 4. 
34 See Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, Induced Abortion 
and Mental Health: A Systematic Review of the Mental Outcomes of 
Induced Abortion, Including their Prevalence and Associated Factors 
8 (December 2011), available at http://www.nccmh.org.uk/ 
repons/ABORTION_REPORT _ WEB%20FINAL.pdf (finding 
that "the rates of mental health problems for women with an 
unwanted pregnancy were the same whether they had an abortion 
or gave birth'' and that "the factors associated with increased rates 
of mental health problems for women in the general population 
following birth and following abortion were similar") [hereinafter 
INDUCED ABORTION]. See also Charles, supra note 18, at 449. 
35 See Dreweke, supra note 31 (stating that 89% of abortions 
occur within the first twelve weeks). 
36 Lawrence B. Finer et. al, Reasons US. Women Have Abortions: 
Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSPECTIVES ON 
SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 110, 110 (2005). 
37 
38 
39 
See supra note 33. 
See Rounds, 686 F.3d. at 900 (majority opinion). 
See APA REPORT 8. 
40 See supra note 33. See also INDUCED ABORTION, supra note 
34, at 8 ("The most reliable predictor of post-abortion mental 
health problems was a history of mental health problems before 
the abortion."). 
41 Charles, supra note 18, at 449 ("(M]aking policy 
recommendations such as the enforcement of so-called "informed 
consent" laws .(which often provide misinformation regarding 
mental health risks of abortion) is unwarranted based on the 
current state of the evidence. If the goal is to help women, we 
are obligated to base program and policy recommendations on 
the best science, rather than using science to advance political 
agenda.") 
42 See Rounds, 686 F.3d at 906 (Loken, J., concurring). 
43 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
882 (1992). 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
See id. at 883. 
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007). 
See Rounds, 686 F.3d at 911 (Murphy,]., dissenting). 
See id. at 912. 
See id. at 899. 
49 See State v. Presidential Women's Center, 707 So.2d 1145, 
1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (striking down an informed 
consent statute because it "standardize[d] the information being 
r:rHE MODERN AlVIERICAN 
given to all women and remove[d] the discretion accorded to 
physicians in all circumstances other than abortion"). 
50 See, e.g., Note, Eighth Circuit Applies Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey to South Dakota "Suicide 
Advisory", 126 HARV. L. REV. 1438, 1446 (2013) ("In Rounds, 
by contrast, physicians were required to provide a specific piece 
of contested information to every patient, regardless of individual 
circumstances, as a part of their own personal disclosure 
obligations."). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
5.l See Yeo, supra note 5, at 358. 
54 See Reva Siegel, The Rights Reasons: Constitutional Conflict 
and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 
DUKE L.J. 1641, 1642-1647, 1655-1664, 1674 (2008). Siegel 
also explores the conscious choice, influenced by market research, 
of anti-abortion activists to shift to a discourse of women's 
health-not as the result of a newfound interest in women's health, 
but in response to perceptions that the antiabortion movement 
cared only about fetuses and not enough about mothers. See id. at 
1669-1673. 
55 Id. at 1652. 
56 Chet Brokaw, Leader of State's Abortion Panel Unhappy with 
Final Report, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS (December 14, 2005), at 
B6. 
57 See Yeo, supra note 5, at 358. It is true that the government 
regulates informed consent to some degree, at least insofar as 
courts have stepped in to establish basic standards and allow 
lawsuits when the standards are not met. However, the courts 
have not told doctors exactly what information to disclose; rather, 
they have called for disclosure "when the exigencies of reasonable 
care call for it" and left the precise disclosures up to the medical 
judgment of the physician. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 
779 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 
689 (R.I. 1972) (physicians must disclose what risks a "reasonable 
person, in what the physician knows or should know is his patient's 
position" would need to know to make an informed decision); 
Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (a 
physician must disclose "all those facts, risks and alternatives that 
a reasonable man in the situation which the physician knew or 
should have known to be the plaintiff's would deem significant 
in making a decision to undergo the recommended treatment"); 
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. ofTr., 317 P.2d 170, 181 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (physician must disclose facts necessary to 
form intelligent consent). 
58 See Yeo, supra note 5, at 358. 
59 See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782-783. See also FADEN, 
supra note 6, at 121; Dolgin, supra note 6, at 97, 100, 102, 104. 
60 See Siegel, supra note 59, at 1663-64. 
61 Id. 
62 See Veith v. O'Brien, 739 N.W.2d 15, 32 (S.D. 2007) ("[W] 
e have consistently held that it is the physician's duty to make full 
disclosure to and obtain informed consent from the patient."). 
63 See id. See also Wheeldon v. Madison, 347 N.W2d 367, 
374 (S.D. 1985). 
SPIUNG20H 
64 See Wheeldon, 347 N.W.2d at 375 ("Materiality . IS 
the cornerstone upon which the physician's duty to disclose is 
based."). 
65 Cf Alan Meisel, The ''Exceptions" to the Informed Consent 
Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical 
Decisionmaking, 1979 WISC. L. REV. 413, 416 (1979) (discussing 
the way disclosure, can and often are made in such a way as to 
influence patient choice according to the doctor's wishes). 
66 See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 
906 (8th Cir. 2012). 
67 See Chinue Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, 
Misinformed Consent: The Medical Accuracy of State-Developed 
Abortion Counseling Materials, 9 GUTTMACHER Pot'Y REv. 6, 6 
(2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/4/ 
gpr090406. pdf. 
68 See Rounds, 686 F.3d at 900. 
69 See id. at 899-900. 
70 See Siegel, supra note 54, at 1655 (citing PAULA ERVIN, 
WOMEN EXPLOITED: THE OTHER VICTIMS OF ABORTION 
(1985)). 
71 
72 
topic. 
See Rounds, 686 F.3d at 900. 
Many thanks to Matthew Aizpuru for his insights on this 
73 It is conceivable that another court could carry this holding 
past even the healthcare realm into the law of trusts, investment 
advising and beyond. Allowing the government to impose 
disclosures of specific, politically identified risks on fiduciary 
relationships has the potential to alter an archetypal legal concept, 
particularly if the plaintiff carries the burden of disproving the 
government's proposed advice. 
9 
